Q&A: Major General Mike Hostage
Advancing Warfighter Effectiveness and Combat Quality
Major General Mike Hostage
Director
Joint Capability Development (J8)
U.S. Joint Forces Command
Hostage entered the Air Force in 1977 as a graduate of Duke University. A graduate of the Air Force Fighter Weapons School, he is a command pilot with more than 4,000 flying hours, with 2,500 in the F-15 and F-16, of which more than 500 are combat hours in both aircraft. He has commanded a fighter squadron, an operations group, and three operational flying wings. Hostage has served on the personal staffs of both the chief of staff and the secretary of the Air Force, and has served as an action officer on the Joint Staff.
Prior to his current assignment, Hostage was the director of intelligence and air, space and information operations (A2/3) at Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, Randolph AFB, Texas.
As this issue of MIT went to press, it was announced that Hostage would become vice commander of the Pacific Air Forces, based at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. His replacement is Air Force Major General David M. Edgington, who has been serving as director of the Air Component Coordination Element, Multi- National Force-Iraq, Air Combat Command.
Q: I understand that USJFCOM J8 has a somewhat unique mission, when compared to the traditional J8 functions at other combatant commands. Can you describe your mission?
A: You are absolutely right. Our mission as the joint capability developer [JCD] is to advance warfighter effectiveness, improve combat capability, and minimize fratricide by leading the interdependent and integrated development and transition of joint, multinational and interagency capabilities, architectures and technologies. Through our capability portfolio management responsibilities, we lead engagement in the Department of Defense command and control requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes to empower the joint force. That is different from traditional J8s, which focus on management of fiscal resources for a command. In JFCOM, our chief of staff executes those duties.
Q: We are hearing a lot lately about DoD activity supporting capability portfolio management. What exactly is that?
A: Capability portfolio management [CPM] is an effort initiated by the department, to manage groups of like-capabilities across the enterprise, shifting to an output-focused model that allows us to measure progress from strategy to outcomes. The need for such a process was made very clear by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the follow-on Strategic Planning Guidance. The documents cited the lack of a designated, empowered joint advocate for joint capabilities, and highlighted the fact that although we consistently fight at a joint level, we still organize, train and equip at the service level.
The CPM “engine” serves as a bridge between how the warfighter fights and how the military services acquire systems to enable that fight. The warfighter reviews threat analyses and the tasks, described by universal joint task lists [UJTLs], required to meet those threats and complete assigned missions. The military services acquire systems and programs to allow their servicespecific forces to complete required tasks. By using a capabilities based analysis to understand how to achieve UJTLs, we map this to the many systems designed to execute a UJTL task, and we look for gaps and redundancies. The CPMs’ output serves to integrate the requirements, acquisition and programmatic processes into a coherent capabilities-based whole.
Q: What is USJFCOM’s role in CPM?
A: In September 2006, the deputy secretary of defense formally designated four CPM test cases, each with a capability portfolio manager. The deputy secretary tasked the commander, USJFCOM with responsibility for managing the Joint Command and Control [JC2] portfolio. The commander has charged me with the daily execution of CPM activity in support of his responsibilities. I should add that the test case designation for CPM was merely used because each of the four CPM constructs is intentionally structured differently in an effort to compare and contrast portfolio management business processes and determine the best attributes of each. It is clear that portfolio management is here to stay. The department’s ability to afford both the migration of legacy programs and the establishment of the vision of future capabilities depends upon its success.
Q: As the JC2 CPM, what were the challenges you faced in PR-09 with the three main DoD processes you attempted to balance—requirements, acquisition and resource allocation?
A: The biggest challenge was making solid, significant enhancement recommendations to department leadership without giving the service chiefs the false impression that the CPMs are usurping their Title X authorities and responsibilities to man, equip and train their forces. Quite the opposite, the joint C2 CPM is working to integrate service-based C2 capability into a joint, interoperable and interdependent whole that supports the joint warfighter and joint force commander, while retaining the ability to execute service-specific missions.
Another challenge is looking at the enterprise through a capability-based lens. We too often think entirely in terms of materiel programs, and the PPBE process is built around this programmatic paradigm. When evaluating courses of action to solve capability gaps, we have historically not done well in considering the full DOTMLPF-P spectrum—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy.
Q: Net-Enabled Command Capability [NECC] is a key underpinning in your vision of future capability for the joint warfighter. Can you expand on that?
A: NECC is the future of C2 for the joint warfighting team. JFCOM is the operational sponsor for NECC, and I wear a hat as the NECC joint combat capability developer [JCCD]. My charge is to bring together active participation by the joint staff, combatant commands, services and agencies to execute capability management and development for this program, for which the Defense Information Systems Agency [DISA], is the materiel developer. A recent issue of your magazine had a superb summary of DISA’s role in this area.
It is critical to our success in this technical endeavor to do away with duplicative, stovepiped, non-interoperable capabilities by driving towards a net-centric, service-oriented Web enterprise. We do this by looking at all the components of C2 seeking to create capability packages that group particular aspects together. These are then turned into capability modules that can be combined and reused in a Web services manner. This method of combining content with operational context allows us to do things differently and remain engaged with everyone across the force. In this way, the JCCD provides direct coupling of warfighter operational capability requirements to the material capability developer to achieve dedicated and continuous, endto- end, warfighter engagement. We manage this process from concept development through testing and certification and on to fielding and sustainment.
Q: What is the most significant challenge you see in transforming DoD’s C2 systems to net-centric capabilities?
A: Ultimately, we want our C2 capabilities to be more agile and responsive in order to adapt quickly to the dynamic warfighting environment we face today. It’s all about the sharing of decision quality information through interoperable systems and exposed databases. In a sense, many of our adversaries are already “net centric” in that they use the power of the Internet and information technology advances to develop, adapt and communicate their plans and tactics rapidly.
Similarly, we need to make our C2 capabilities more net-centric by better leveraging available information technology, while still maintaining appropriate levels of security. To do so, we are working closely with our partners in DISA and the services to deliver joint C2 capabilities using a service-oriented architecture approach. Here we are faced with three key challenges: defining and describing operational “business” processes; identifying critical data sources and making them readily available; and defining and enforcing an operational data strategy that promotes sharing of information between the services and with our multinational and interagency partners.
Q: How are you addressing these challenges?
A: Net-centric C2 capability development is being addressed on many fronts, including at the service and individual program level, through C2-related communities of interest that address a particular type of data or C2 business process, and on a larger scale through NECC. To define and describe operational processes, JFCOM is developing joint C2 operational architectures and related analytical products that detail warfighting processes, information exchange requirements and required C2 functionality.
To identify critical data sources, we are working with the combatant commands, services, agencies and C2-related communities of interest to identify authoritative data sources for particular operational processes. To develop an operational data strategy, we are also working with the C2 community to develop a C2 data framework that includes guidance, best practices, and core C2 data standards needed for joint C2 interoperability. These elements—joint C2 operational architectures, authoritative data sources, and the C2 Data Framework—are then integrated into the joint capabilities development process and become the basis for materiel developers such as DISA to build rapidly the modular, net-centric capability needed in the field.
Q: How is JFCOM ensuring that these service-oriented technologies will perform well for C2? After all, if a Web service doesn’t work for an Internet user, its consequences are not as dire as they could be for the warfighter in the future who relies on similar technologies.
A: This technology must be robust and well-tested, and must support many different types of C2 assessment, piloting, and test activities. As a specific example, JFCOM and STRATCOM have formed a partnership to lead a series of C2 data pilot events with the services and DISA to evaluate emerging service-oriented capabilities. The July 2007 C2 data pilot focused on bringing together multiple Air Force, Navy, DISA and National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency service-oriented capabilities. It used a mission thread that employed the Navy’s new maritime headquarters concept in the role of a joint force maritime component commander. It brought together the leading-edge Web services capabilities from NECC, Net-Centric Enterprise Services [NCES] and service or agency C2 programs and included an operational assessment from the operational test agencies.
We learned a lot about how these Web services interact and the technical challenges faced using these technologies in a C2 context. Collectively, we still have a long way to go to refine service- oriented technologies for use in C2. However, with events like the C2 data pilot and other initiatives like the Federated Development and Certification Environment, also known as the “sandbox,” and NECC capability provisioning events, we are confident that we will work through these challenges and the C2 material developers will be able to deliver needed C2 capabilities in a more rapid and tailored fashion.
Q: Can you give an example of a joint process that will benefit from these net-centric capabilities in the near term?
A: A good example is the force management process, which is integral to JFCOM’s role as the joint force provider and to many other processes across the department such as joint deployment, readiness reporting, and adaptive planning. JFCOM and the joint staff, in coordination with combatant commands and the services, have initiated a project focused on streamlining our force management processes and adapting existing capabilities and/or developing new capabilities to improve the effectiveness of these processes. Presently there are more than 50 systems involved in providing data to decision makers in the force management process. Many of these systems are duplicative, do not use authoritative data sources, and/or do not readily share data.
By first describing the key force management processes and information requirements, identifying the authoritative data sources, and defining core data standards to employ, we will have the basis for developing net-centric capabilities. Then, early next year we will expose some force management data from the supporting systems using Web services as part of the C2 data pilot. This will provide some near-term net-centric force management capability and will support the migration of additional force management capability to NECC, all at a reduced cost as compared to traditional point-to-point data sharing approaches.
Q: In your role as J8, you wear another hat as the co-chair of Combat Identification-Blue Force Tracking [CID-BFT] Executive Steering Committee [ESC]. What has been the most critical joint problem addressed by the ESC?
A: The Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC] chartered the ESC in response to the August 2004 “Lessons Learned DOTMLPF Change Recommendation [DCR], Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations Finding: Fratricide Prevention.” One of the short-term recommendations in the DCR was to assign USJFCOM as DoD mission proponent for CID. The first meeting of the ESC was held in January 2006 with participants from the services, combatant commands and DoD agencies.
One of the first actions undertaken by the ESC was to address the lack of coordination among the services concerning procurement of the Mark XIIA Identification Friend or Foe [IFF] Mode 5 System. The Mark XIIA is the replacement for the older Mark XII [Mode 4] system. Although Mark XIIA is a joint interest system, there is no Mode 5 joint program office. The services, including the Coast Guard, were developing separate procurement plans, establishing platform-specific IOC and FOC dates, and had not coordinated policy, doctrine or procedures for employing this new cooperative CID capability. One of the priority tasks for the ESC was to achieve a coordinated acquisition strategy for IFF.
An all-service IOC of 2014 was established for a “deployable joint package” of interoperable Mode 5 capabilities with all required logistical, maintenance and training support that could be used in expeditionary operations smaller than Major Combat Operations, and a Joint FOC of 2020.
This concept made sense to the combatant commands, supported the joint operational T&E community, and was endorsed by all the services and the joint staff at the JROC, resulting in a Mark XIIA Acquisition Decision Memorandum by USD [AT&L]. It is a very useful metric for all services to assess their Mark XIIA funding profiles as they prepare for their POM 10 submissions. In fact, the ESC is tasked to return to the JROC next spring to report out on how Mark XIIA and other investment recommendations made in POM 08 are faring in POM 10.
Q: What effort is JFCOM devoting to the goal of reducing the danger of fratricide when directing close air support fires?
A: JFCOM has identified key shortfalls in JCAS [joint close air support], terminal control capabilities through live assessments and evaluations. For instance:
• Talking a pilot’s eyes onto a target takes time and is often not conclusive.
• Pilots have a limited capability to verify target ID independently.
• Errors occur when manually copying and entering target coordinates.
• Automated system features without checks and balances can lead to errors.
• Accurate visual assessment of the aim point of a strike aircraft from the ground is difficult even under ideal conditions.
Historical evidence shows that most CAS fratricides occur because standard procedures are not followed or the intended target is misidentified.
To address the issue of standardization, the JFCOM-chaired JCAS ESC led the development of the multi-national Joint Terminal Attack Controller [JTAC] and Forward Air Controller [Airborne] Memoranda of Agreement, which established training and certification standards for terminal attack controllers. To propagate these standards, a JFCOM-led JTAC standardization team conducts initial accreditation and biennial course reviews of all JTAC schoolhouses for MOA signatories.
To aid in the proper identification of targets, JFCOM provided essential support in fielding and training of the Digital Precision Strike Suite coordinate generation software integrated into the JTAC equipment suites, and published new procedures to improve laser range finder and satellite navigation system target location accuracies. JFCOM was also instrumental in promoting the use of Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver, which provides real-time, full motion video for situational awareness and targeting. JFCOM led the effort to develop and field the Rapid Attack Information Dissemination Execution Relay system, which will provide blue force situational awareness data to terminal attack controllers. We are continuing the efforts to reduce fratricide potential by spearheading the establishment of a JCAS digital data exchange standard that will enable the seamless exchange of critical target and friendly location information between the JTAC, weapon delivery platforms, and command and control agencies.
Q: Has JFCOM evaluated the military utility of specific antifratricide technologies?
A: The JFCOM-sponsored Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration [CCID ACTD] has been a catalyst for not only assessing fratricide prevention technologies, but also moving proven solutions into the acquisition process. A notable CCID ACTD milestone was a large scale operational demonstration during September-October 2005 in the United Kingdom. The U.S. and eight other nations provided ground and air forces employing the ACTD’s technologies in scenarios representative of coalition operations.
The participating coalition warfighters and analysts determined that two technologies, battlefield target identification device and radio based combat identification provided a useful, complementary capability to identify friendly ground forces quickly and accurately and minimize fratricide from either direct or supporting fires [artillery, mortars, close air support]. Joint combat identification marking system provided a discriminating IR signature and radio frequency tags demonstrated potential, but more development is necessary to achieve a useful discrimination capability in the cockpit. Building upon this momentum and in partnership with the U.S. Air Force, we extended the CCID ACTD through 2008 in order to assess other CID technologies employed by fixed wing aircrew in attacking ground targets. Two additional nations have joined the original CCID ACTD group in this extended phase.
CCID ACTD Extension, Bold Quest, assessed the military utility of a synthetic aperture radar/aided target recognition on JSTARS and the Laser Target Imaging Program on the Litening Advanced Targeting Pod in a coalition operational environment. As well, we validated U.S. strike aircraft capability to exchange digital targeting data with U.S. JTAC digital suites, including the Air Force Tactical Air Control Party CAS System, Marine Corps Target Locator Designator Handoff System/StrikeLink, and the Special Operations Command Battlefield Air Operations Kit.
In a huge step for our ability to address coalition warfighting shortfalls, we and our coalition partners assessed coalition CAS aircraft ability to exchange digital targeting data with U.S. and other nations’ JTAC digital suites. All of these, and other Bold Quest technical and procedural precedents, can dramatically improve our ability to provide friendly and enemy locations to aircrew, enhancing their combat effectiveness and minimizing the risk of air-ground fratricide.
Q: How do you know you are getting the Joint Fires improvements right for the joint warfighter?
A: I see your point, and the answer is coming from work done by the Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team [JFIIT]. This group of military and civilian experts, based at Eglin AFB, interacts directly with the joint warfighter in both training venues and in CENTCOM’s AOR. They are focused on, and in direct support of, the tactical edge. Their expertise and focus provides a holistic approach to improving joint fires, and they drive capability improvements and training improvements up to me in the J8 for action across the services. For example, when the Army TRADOC commander, General Wallace, identified issues causing concern for our forces operating in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment, my team at Eglin extracted those specific issues pertaining to joint fires and worked with the services to develop solutions that warfighters could apply at home station and at our combat training centers as part of their workup prior to deploying to the theater. JFIIT continues to facilitate cultural and institutional change in these areas and ultimately the warfighter is returning to theater more informed and more capable of operating in that demanding environment.
Q: What is the role of the Joint Systems Integration Command [JSIC] in your work?
A: Another of our subordinate units, the JSIC, serves as an honest broker to provide objective observations of system capabilities, based on independent analysis. The assessment data is generated by several initiatives, including mapping system capabilities to warfighting functions; developing metrics to broadly measure net-centricity and interoperability, based on policy statements [objective] and warfighter utility measures [subjective]; building a scorecard to estimate the degree to which the systems of interest comply with existing interoperability policy and required operational utility; developing a registry to identify capability gaps, overlaps, and disconnects and to match COCOM issues to system functions and recommend follow-on analyses; and maintaining a persistent test and assessment environment to provide federated or distributed lab facilities, desktop analysis support, and associated services to inform CPM assessments.
JSIC has a very robust analytic capability. They are the bellybutton for the analysis required in support of JC2 portfolio management, and if there is a task they are unable to conduct, they serve as the natural conduit to reach out and connect with the broader federation of service, agency and industry analytic capability.
Q: I imagine that JSIC plays a major role in the advancement of NECC?
A: Absolutely. JSIC supports my JCD and JCCD roles with oversight and execution of the NECC Test and Evaluation Program.
JSIC’s responsibilities are to ensure joint context and operational requirements are incorporated during each phase of testing; support the operational test agencies in conducting joint capability and joint interoperability assessments; monitor capability modules as they progress through the development, developmental piloting and operational piloting phases and support selected execution of capability modules events; and ensure DOTMLPF-P solutions are integrated and synchronized into test objectives and assessed during test events.
Q: What is JSIC’s role in coalition partnership interoperability?
A: The coalition operation in Afghanistan transitioned to a NATO-led operation in October 2006. The history of the operation and the fact that the mission consists of multiple national units has led to numerous national-specific functional systems being deployed. Furthermore, the current operation makes use of at least five different networks. The multiple national systems embedded in the operation necessitate several data transfers between systems and between networks. The result is ad hoc communication structures and significant delays in information reaching the right level of command.
To solve this problem, JSIC has partnered with the Allied Command Transformation to develop a C2 reference model of the environment that will be used for experimentation, testing and validation of existing capabilities as well as emerging capabilities in support of international security assistance force operations in Afghanistan. This reference model will duplicate the architecture in theater and focus primarily on the systems where most issues occur. In addition, a reference facility will be established near NATO Headquarters in Belgium, allowing national labs to interconnect and assess interoperability of each participating nation’s functional systems. JSIC’s primary mission will be to provide the U.S. command and control systems to the NATO environment. ♦
