From CONOPS to Execution
MILESTONE FOR NETOPS POLICY BEGINS TO DEFINE FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATING AND DEFENDING THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID.
Imagine being handed a blank sheet of paper and asked to develop an actionable construct to transform the operation the Global Information Grid(GIG), taking it from a multitude of individual enclaves to a singular system of information capability.
This challenge is precisely what strategists in the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) had to accomplish. After diligent white board sessions, intensive intensive authoring and extensive community coordination, these strategists were able to obtain approval for the Joint Concept of Operations for GIG NetOps.
Signed by the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the document codified the first steps in defining a framework for directing the operations and defense of the GIG. Although it has undergone at least two formal revisions, its core elements remain intact, and it is now recognized with other DoD transformation strategy documents.
The CONOPS, as it is commonly referred to, is not, by itself, an authoritative or binding document. It is, however, an indepth examination of three broad tasks that must be universally performed in order to achieve NetOps: enterprise management, network defense and content management. More importantly, the CONOPS is an ambitious treatment of what is among the most complex issues facing the DoD today: how to transform the GIG into a welloperated medium that enhances the speed, accuracy and quality of military decision making.
Achieving this objective requires all elements of the DoD enterprise, regardless of location or function, to acknowledge a common body of rules and compliance relationships. The CONOPS represents the confluence of Information Age thinking and traditional military command and control, envisioning the GIG in terms of a global asset that must also be responsive to regional requirements.
In short, the CONOPS lays the groundwork for centralized governance, shared situational awareness and decentralized execution of the DoD enterprise, bringing resultant benefit to all user levels, from business to warfighting to intelligence. It seeks to make the GIG a genuine catalyst for change throughout the department.
UNIFYING FRAMEWORK
Developing a construct to bring the DoD’s total information technology assets together under a single operational lens was a tremendous undertaking. Through each revision of the document there was extensive input, with hundreds of critical comments voiced by DoD organizations. The main success of the CONOPS was that it rallied the community to consider just how difficult NetOps is, and it introduced the idea that a single, unifying framework is required to enable net-centric operations.
If the CONOPS can be credited for generating debate and building consensus, there were other, equally important advancements that occurred in parallel to this staffing effort. For example, the Unified Command Plan for 2006 included more focused attention on NetOps than had previous versions, stating that USSTRATCOM will plan, integrate and coordinate “DoD global network operations.” This unprecedented use of “network operations” in a presidentially endorsed document signified a fundamental change i n the importance and visibility of NetOps.
Moreover, 2006 brought a crucial organizational change, with service NetOps centers formally assigned to USSTRATCOM. This new structure galvanized NetOps alliances and gave the JTF-GNO operational control over key nodes within the GIG, creating the conditions for more tangible, robust and distinct C2 relationships.
Taken together, these overarching developments contributed to the creation of an operations plan known as 05-01. OPLAN 05-01 offers a comprehensive set of tasks and conditions upon which JTFGNO components are to plan and execute the NetOps mission. This year, 05-01 will undergo a revision that considers lessons learned and the emerging best practices now employed by net operators.
The publication of these documents is a powerful indicator of how far NetOps has come in terms of its integral application. In other words, the mission is being performed today, despite the presence or absence of additional NetOps policy or doctrine. Watch standers, intelligence analysts, computer forensics personnel and a host of support functions make up a Joint Task Force that is actively directing the operations and defense of the GIG around the clock. Such operations are yielding very telling metrics about improvements in the integrity of the DoD’s information networks, such as a four-fold increase in the use of Common Access Cards and a significant reduction in computer security incidents.
The good news underlying all of these developments is that NetOps is enjoying a steady climb toward operational maturity, which is essential in today’s information environment. Hostile actors who seek to sabotage or steal information are constantly modifying their tactics and enjoying greater opportunities to disrupt the network on a wider scale. As the command responsible for integrating DoD information operations, USSTRATCOM is refining its role and is helping to define how it will influence operations in cyberspace as a whole, not just the GIG.
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
To this end, it is involved in the advancement of two important strategy documents: the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations and the command’s own campaign plan, known as 8039. These documents take a broad view of cyber operations and consider the deliberate planning activities that must take place to add fidelity and actionable tasks to protecting cyberspace. The themes underlying both of these documents is that national interests--commerce, transportation, fuel and others--are heavily reliant upon a secure network, and their disruption may have a potentially crippling impact on military readiness.
Developing NetOps policies that complement this new cyber domain gains importance by the day, as dependence upon the network increases commensurate with the forces that seek to sabotage it. There are traditional threats, such as the hobbyists and hackers that have plagued the Internet since its inception, as well as more organized and deliberate actors, such as nation states and syndicated criminal elements. Although numerous laws and user practices have been developed to mitigate the threats to the network, these defensive activities alone do not equate to a well-operated enterprise. NetOps ultimately relies upon a highly educated community of network users who must be intuitively aware of how security modifications, network failures and degraded performance affect their operations.
As demonstrated by the CONOPS, crafting appropriate NetOps policies is a challenging prospect. Numerous gaps and seams must be overcome before these policies can succeed. These gaps exist primarily at three levels: organizational, technological, and command and control (C2).
In terms of organizational gaps, NetOps exposes some of the perennial challenges posed by a DoD whose services and agencies purchase equipment and whose combatant commanders operate it. This not only creates a variety of compatibility issues, but potentially draws synthetic boundaries across an enterprise that is fundamentally global.
Moreover, defense agencies and activities are not traditionally considered accountable “components” in the traditional warfighting sense, yet operating and defending the GIG as an enterprise relies on their due diligence and compliance with centrally issued orders. Additionally, there are organizational issues to consider when DoD networks interface with external government agencies, intelligence activities and coalition partners.
Ironically, technology itself is yet another potential gap within NetOps policy. New communications capabilities and standards surface daily, yet policy takes months or even years to materialize. A responsive, optimized GIG cannot depend upon these traditional policy development processes, but instead requires innovative and time-sensitive decision cycles that implement configuration changes in minutes, not months.
C2 of the network poses the third policy gap. Time-honored military precepts such as “unity of command” gain complexity as NetOps introduces the Information Age concepts of “end to end” networks and “seamless” communications. If cyberspace is indeed location agnostic, then traditional geographic boundaries give way to a more novel definition of command and control. Activities must be coordinated and deconflicted in order to render global network integrity while accommodating local operations. This local application of global rules is a function of risk mitigation: What enterprisewide security modifications should be deferred in order to accommodate current operations in a given theater? This balancing act represents the art and science of NetOps, an operational tradeoff that requires careful management, responsive reporting, situational awareness and strong C2 relationships.
POLICY DOCUMENTS
These three gaps are being actively addressed at the DoD level, where policy makers are overhauling their current inventory of directives and creating a streamlined body of departmentwide documents. From NetOps to configuration management and beyond, these documents address centers of gravity within the GIG and prescribe a new, relevant and unified set of roles and responsibilities for all who field and manage information technology.
Even with the transformational tone brought about by the CONOPS, deliberate plans and DoD directives, policy will only do so much in galvanizing universal procedures for operating and defending the GIG. Bringing a sense of order and discipline to the entire information enterprise will take some time, and determining how actions in one isolated corner of the GIG affect multiple users in another will only come with culture change and a common sense of information stewardship. What is clear, however, is that threats to the enterprise not only exist, they are becoming more potent and potentially harmful.
The CONOPS is an important expression of USSTRATCOM’s cyber mission, and its staffing was a value-added exercise in terms of conveying the complexity of GIG operations and defense and winning basic consensus. With its third version now complete, the CONOPS has effectively set the bar for the follow-on policies and procedures needed to cauterize its tenets. Enterprise policies and associated procedures must be endorsed and universally practiced to move the CONOPS from doctrine to wholesale execution. This will require innovative leadership at all levels, as well as incremental changes in organizational culture, technology standards and command relationships.
While the CONOPS is a sound, carefully articulated set of concepts, NetOps must now be the common practice, etched into the mindsets of those who advocate GIG capabilities, those who rely upon its benefits, and those who operate and defend its collective networks. ♦
